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Abstract 
Generally deployed in an unattended environment, 
a sensor network can be easily assaulted or 
compromised by adversaries. Network security 
becomes a major problem. A distributed node 
revocation scheme is effective in reducing the damages 
a compromised node may cause to a sensor network, 
but its operation tends to consume large-scale memory 
space of the hardware-constrained sensor nodes. To 
reduce such complexity, this paper presents a new 
distributed voting revocation scheme based on the 
one-way hash chain, the concept of threshold secret 
sharing, the certificate revocation list and the 
public-key cryptography.  
1. Introduction 
Generally deployed in unattended environments to 
collect the needed information, a sensor network can 
be easily assaulted by adversaries. Network security 
becomes a major problem. A number of security 
devices, including key management [e.g., 1-5], are 
established to enhance the security. Key management 
involves key distribution and revocation [6]. Key 
distribution disseminates secret information to the 
principals to initialize secure communications. Key 
revocation, on the other hand, aims to remove secrets 
that may have been snapped by attackers from a 
compromised node and thus results in revocation of the 
compromised node.  
Node revocation is critical in reducing the damage 
(e.g. information leakage) a compromised node may 
cause to a sensor network. A node revocation scheme 
is designed mainly to cut off all links between 
compromised nodes and normal nodes. A node 
revocation scheme can work in a centralized way, 
such as the EG scheme [6], in which the base station 
(BS) is responsible for conducting and broadcasting 
revocation decisions. It can also work in a distributed
way, i.e., the compromised node’s neighbor nodes will 
initiate and broadcast revocation decisions without the 
assistance of the BS. The CPS [7], CGPM [8] and CC 
[9] are all distributed node revocation schemes. A 
distributed node revocation scheme can react more 
quickly than a centralized scheme and as a result 
reduce both delay time and communication cost. 
This paper introduces a new distributed node 
revocation scheme based on the one-way hash chain 
[10], the certificate revocation list (CRL) [11] and the 
public key cryptography (PKC) [2]. In our scheme, the 
BS first signs a certificate to each node before 
deployment. Each certificate has a unique ID which 
allows a node to prove it is authorized to access such 
services as data authentication or node revocation. 
When a node detects another node in the network has 
been compromised, it can broadcast the CRL with the 
compromised node’s certificate ID to all neighbor 
nodes. Receiving such a broadcast packet, a neighbor 
node will authenticate its validity by the attached hash 
value. If the validity is verified, the neighbor node will 
increase the revocation vote count. When the 
revocation votes against a node exceed the threshold 
value t, each neighbor node will cut off their links to 
the revoked node to protect the network from an 
adversary’s further attack. To reduce the calculation 
cost, we bring in the one-way hash function and the 
XOR operation. Performance evaluation shows that our 
scheme outperforms the other target schemes in 
enhancing network security at reasonable calculation 
cost which is acceptable to the sensor nodes.  
2. The PKC and CRL in Our Scheme 
2.1. The PKC for Sensor Networks 
Pursuing secure performance of a sensor network is 
quite a technical challenge as security mechanisms 
must work under the very limited processing and 
bandwidth constraints of the sensor nodes. PKC is thus 
considered an inappropriate security mechanism for the 
sensor network as it needs a lot of calculation and 
energy resources. Instead, the less complex symmetric 
encryption is widely taken to maintain the security of a 
sensor network. Key management for symmetric-key 
based protocols is nevertheless complicated and prone 
to adversaries’ attacks as it can not pre-load all master 
keys (due to the high mobility and a limited memory 
space) which sensor nodes need if to communicate 
with security managers. By contrast, a public-key 
based protocol yields more flexibility and scalability, 
especially in large sensor networks where new devices 
keep entering the cluster. 
Public key authentication, one important PKC 
operation, is to verify the authenticity of another 
node’s public key, i.e., to make certain a public key 
truly belongs to its claimed owner. In original PKC, 
such a public-key-authentication operation involves 
expensive signature verification on a certificate. To 
authenticate a public key in a more efficient way, [12] 
manage to save the needed memory space by letting 
each node carry a one-way hash value of those public 
keys. When two nodes exchange their public keys, 
each can simply compute the one-way hash value of 
the received public key and check if the result matches 
the value stored in their memory, to save energy. 
A public-key based node revocation scheme, such 
as the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [2] or RSA 
[13], works better in many ways in a sensor 
environment than the symmetric cryptography.  
2.2. Employing the CRL in Our Scheme 
The dynamic multicast group management protocol 
in [11] is proposed to solve such problems as mobility, 
unreliable links and multi-hop communication cost 
which are specific to the ad hoc networks. The main 
idea is to let group members actively involve in the 
security of the multicast group, thus reducing the 
communication and computation load on the source. 
As group members are in charge of group security, a 
service right certificate is used to verify that a node is 
authorized to join the group and the group members 
(nodes) can use it to exchange keys without contacting 
a public-key center (such as the BS). A service right 
certificate has the following properties. Any participant 
can read a certificate to determine its owner’s name 
and public key, and to verify the authenticity of the 
certificate (originating from the certificate authority, 
i.e., the CA) as well as its currency. The CA will be the 
only party to create and update the certificates. 
The idea of the service right certificate and its 
corresponding node revocation scheme helps initiate 
and shape our new node revocation scheme. In our 
initial design, we assume a CA pre-distributes 
certificates to every node before deployment and each 
certificate has its own sequence number. When a node 
discovers another node has been compromised, it will 
broadcast a certificate revocation list (CRL, whose 
format is [MinSˡΨ˖̈̅̅˸́̇˦ˡΨ˟˼̆̇ˢ˹˥˸̉̂˾˸˷˖˸̅̇Ψ
˧˼̀˸̆̇˴̀̃Ψ˦˼˺́˴̇̈̅˸˰) with the sequence number of 
the compromised node to the neighbor nodes. 
Receiving the list, the neighbor nodes can authenticate 
it by the attached signature and, if the signature is 
correct, cut off the links with the compromised node. 
Cutting links to a compromised node in this way helps 
the network avoid an adversary’s further attacks and 
maintain its normal performance. The digital signature 
in a CRL employs the asymmetric cryptographic 
technology to produce the private keys. As a private 
key can not be copied by other nodes and is not open, 
the signature signed by a private key can not be copied 
either. The node receiving the cryptographic digital 
signature thus can use the attached public key to verify 
the contents of the signature. 
3. The Proposed Node Revocation Scheme 
Verifying the digital signature in a CRL is indeed 
quite a burden for the energy-constrained sensor 
networks. To conserve the limited resources of a sensor 
network, our node revocation scheme adopts a new and 
efficient verifying approach based on the one-way 
hash chain in [10] to replace the costly verification of 
the digital signature. The one-way hash function is 
adopted as it can map an input of an arbitrary length to 
an output of a certain fixed length, such as 20 bytes for 
the SHA-1 algorithm and 32 bytes for the SHA-2 
algorithm. Compared with traditional PKC which 
consists of a signature (at least 256 bytes) and other 
data including the public key (at least 128 bytes), the 
hashing value of the one-way hash function is clearly 
shorter. The computation and communication cost for 
verifying a CRL can be thus significantly reduced. 
3.1. The Operation of the New Scheme 
First define the one-way hash chain. Assuming H is 
a one-way hash function and r is a randomly selected 
number, a hash chain can be derived by iteratively 
hashing r: Hi(r) = H (Hi-1(r)) (i = 1, 2, …). With r being 
the trust root, the one-way hash chain includes a 
sequence of hashed values, denoted by h1= H(r), h2 = H 
(h1), …, hi = H (hi-1) (i = 1, 2,…). Our node revocation 
scheme includes the generation of PKC, verification of 
the status and revocation vote. 
Generating the PKC 
Note that in an ad hoc network, a node’s PKC will 
be generated by itself and authenticated by an offline 
CA. In our design for a sensor network, however, the 
BS becomes the CA to distribute the PKC to each node 
before deployment and each node will authenticate the 
PKC via the BS after deployment. 
To be more specific, the BS in our scheme will 
pre-distribute a public key PKU and a private key SKU
to a node U before it is deployed to a sensor 
environment. Assuming all system clocks are 
synchronized in the sensor network, the maximal 
lifetime T for every PKC will be the same, and so will 
be the update interval L (T / L = j (j > 1)). Node U then 
defines the starting valid date as D when receiving the 
public key and the private key. The update point for the 
ith period [Di-1, Di] is denoted as Di : Di = D + i * L (i 
= 1,2,…, j; D0 = D). U moves on to select a random 
number r and generate the corresponding one-way hash 
chain by hashing r j times. Node U then sends a PKC 
request containing PKU, D and hj to the BS. The BS 
will authenticate the received PKC request and, if the 
authentication is built, examine the hash values 
submitted by the other nodes. If finding another hj’= hj,
the BS will inform Node U that the r it sends over is 
unqualified. U needs to select anther random number 
and generate its corresponding one-way hash chain. 
After re-examining the hash value, the BS then issues 
node U a PKC, denoted as PKCU = SIGNCA(CID, U, 
PKU, D, hj), where CID represents the certificate’s ID. 
Verifying the Status 
After deployment, nodes build secure links between 
each other by exchanging their certificates. As 
mentioned, nodes in our scheme use the one-way hash 
chain, instead of the digital signature, to authenticate 
each other’s certificate and thus to maintain the 
security of the network with reduced 
energy-consumption. The process of certificate 
verification is listed below. 
1. When a node (the certificate verifier) needs to 
verify a PKCU, it will send a query including the 
CID to the corresponding certificate owner (i.e., 
node U) which then sends its PKCU to the 
requesting node. 
2. Upon receiving the requested certificate, the node 
obtains the starting valid date D and the hash value 
hj from the PKCU.
3. If the current time is T’, the node computes 
parameter i = [(T’-D)/L] by T’. 
4. The node then calculates the value hEND by hashing 
hj-i i times, and checks  if hEND = hj. If yes, PKCU is 
considered valid at present and remains valid until 
the next updating point. Otherwise, it is invalid. 
3.2. Node Revocation Using Traditional CRL 
To revoke a compromised node, a traditional 
certificate revocation scheme uses the CRL, a signature 
structure containing the revocation message. When a 
node finds out another node is compromised, it takes 
the following two steps. 
1. The node first broadcasts to the neighbor nodes a 
CRL whose format is [U, D, RevocationCID hУ j,
Timestamp]. RevocationCID hУ j contains the ID of 
the certificate to be revoked. Each certificate has its 
own ID. The timestamp is used to prevent repeated 
broadcasting of a list, thus saving the energy. 
2. When a neighbor node receives the CRL packet and 
finds that hj of RevocationCID hУ j is correct, it will 
calculate the RevocationCID by RevocationCIDУ
hj hУ j. The hj to be used later can be authenticated 
by the value received during the connection time 
and if RevocationCID hУ jУhj is correct, the value 
of RevocationCID can be thus obtained to revoke 
the compromised node. 
In such a scheme, it is likely that an attacker gathers 
the CRL, alters the value of RevocationCIDУ hj and 
broadcasts the altered value to the neighbor nodes to 
confuse them into revoking the wrong (normal) nodes. 
To give an example, suppose the original revocation ID 
is 0001 and the previous hj stored in a node’s memory 
is 0010. In the regular situation, the node will figure 
out RevocationCID hУ j as 0011. However, if an 
attacker intrudes a neighbor node or eavesdrops in the 
communication range and finds out the 0011 value, it 
can alter 0011 to 0100 and broadcast 0100 out. Such an 
altered false value will mislead the other nodes to 
obtain a wrong CID 0110 and proceed to revoke the 
normal node whose CID = 0110 by mistake.  
To prevent similar mistakes from happening, our 
new scheme adopts the voting way to revoke the 
compromised nodes: When the number of wrong 
revocation votes is below the threshold t, node 
revocation will not be conducted. 
3.3. Our Distributed Voting Certificate 
Revocation Scheme 
Our new scheme sets a voting threshold value t to 
carry out the requested node revocation. Each node 
will have m voting participants, m>>t, and d secure 
links with the neighbor nodes, d being its dimension 
degree. Out of security consideration, we define d>>t. 
The value of t should exceed 1 (revocation vote) at 
least and is so defined as d = m>>t>1. The actual value 
should be set according to the number of deployed 
nodes in the network. Setting up a proper value of t is 
important as it can substantially affect the performance 
of a node revocation scheme. An improperly large t 
will make the voting scheme difficult to operate, 
whereas an unfeasibly small t will shake the security of 
such a scheme and draw more attacks from adversaries. 
The value of RevocationCID hУ j in a CRL indicates 
a revocation vote. When a node receives a number of 
votes to revoke a compromised node by its voting 
members and the number exceeds the threshold t, it 
will revoke the key shared with the compromised node 
in the key ring and cut off its link with the target node. 
As the voting members of the node may not be its 
neighbors, how to inform all of them of this revocation 
event becomes a critical problem. To solve the problem, 
we consult an approach in [8] which enables all voting 
members to receive the revocation list through 
broadcast propagation, even if they are not neighbors 
with each other. 
To conserve the limited resources of a sensor 
network, our scheme also employs the XOR operation, 
instead of other encryption algorithms. Energy 
consumption of an XOR operation is so small that it is 
nearly negligible at performance evaluation. To put our 
distributed voting node revocation scheme into work, 
we let each node store the r hash values of the r nodes 
in its key ring, thus generating O(r) space complexity. 
Compared with the space complexity O(Stotalr log r) of 
[8], our scheme apparently needs less storing device. 
Now assume D suspects A has been compromised 
and thus broadcasts CIDAУhjD to B and C. After 
receiving the packet, B and C use the preloaded 
information to authenticate CIDAУhjD. If the value is 
correct, they will take it down as the first received 
revocation vote against A. If, some time later, C also 
broadcasts CIDAУhjC to neighbor nodes B and D and 
the value of CIDAУhjC is also authenticated, node B 
now holds two valid revocation votes against A and 
will thus move on to revoke the key shared with A and 
cut off its link to A. 
4. Performance Evaluation 
Performance evaluation is conducted to compare 
certain existing node revocation schemes and our 
distributed voting revocation scheme. As mentioned 
earlier, our scheme is expected to generate higher 
computation and communication cost than the other 
schemes due to its employment of the PKC mechanism. 
Such cost is acceptable given the enhanced network 
security it brings about; it is also affordable as the 
chance to pay such a cost is rare but critical. 
4.1. Complexities for Our New Scheme 
Before node deployment, the space complexity for 
our node revocation scheme will be O(r) because each 
node is set to preload its own private key and the 
public keys of its r neighbors. After deployment, each 
node must reserve rooms for the r hash values of the r 
nodes in its key ring – to maintain the normal operation 
of the distributed voting revocation scheme. The space 
complexity for our scheme remains O(r). Compared 
with the space complexity O (Stotalr log r) of [8], our 
scheme apparently needs less storing space. 
4.2. Energy Consumption 
Table 1 gives energy consumption on the sensor 
side for our scheme and the scheme in [2] which also 
involves the PKC mechanism. To evaluate energy 
consumption, we adopt the following processing time 
on the sensor side [2]. 
1. The random point scalar multiplication is 480 msec 
and the fixed point multiplication is 130 msec. 
2. The SHA-1 algorithm takes 2 msec to digest a 
128-bit binary string on the M16C. 
3. The Cipher Block Chaining mode takes less than 3 
msec to decrypt a 256-bit ciphertext. 
4. The sensor does a 160-bit modular multiplication, 
which takes less than 3 msec, and a 160-bit modular 
addition, which takes less than 3 msec. 
Table 1. Energy consumption on the sensor side 
Processing time on 
sensor 
Communication 
complexity 
Our scheme 17+2t msec 352 bits 
Reference[2] 760 msec 1437 bits 
[2] replaces the scalar multiplication of fixed points 
P and PKCA by a pre-computed look-up table in the 
ROM area and needs at least one expensive 
elliptic-curve scalar multiplication of a random point in 
the key exchange phase. On the sensor side, the time 
taken in the key exchange phase will be 480 msec for a 
random point scalar multiplication, 130 msec for a 
fixed point multiplication. Thus the entire protocol 
execution time on M16C is about 480 msec + 130 
mesc * 2 + 20 msec = 760 msec, which is also taken as 
the time complexity for the key distribution phase in 
our scheme. 
After key distribution, the calculation time for a 
node to accept a certificate issued by the BS or to 
return the certificate to the BS will be far less than the 
time consumed in the key distribution phase. At this 
phase, instead of calculating the time-consuming fixed 
point multiplication and random point scalar 
multiplication, we will conduct only the modular 
Table 2. Comparison among our scheme and the schemes in [9] and [8] 
 The CC Scheme [9] The CGPM Scheme [8] Our scheme 
Basic concept Using threshold secret sharing to vote Using threshold secret sharing to vote Using CRL to vote 
Encryption type Symmetric cryptography Symmetric cryptography Asymmetric cryptography 
Preload 
information in 
sensor nodes 
¾ q(x) = D+a1x1+…+at-1xt-1 
¾ q(x), x
¾ Hq(x)=H(D || a1 || a2 || ...|| at-1)
¾ maskBas and H2(qBs)
¾ a path of log r hash tree values for 
each of B’s neighbors and RB
¾ EmaskABs[qBs(xABs), xABs)]
¾ The hash value of neighbor nodes 
¾ The certificate revocation vote 
from other nodes 
Space complexity O(sØt) O(Stotalrlogr) O(r) 
Votesȷ
authentication No
Using the Merkle tree to  
authenticate votes 
Using the hash value in a certificate to 
authenticate votes 
Network Security low medium high 
multiplication, the modular addition and the hash 
function hj to verify the signature issued by the BS. 
According to [2], in a sensor network implemented on 
Mitsubishi’s M16C microprocessor with the size of 
5.2Kbyte code/data, the time taken for one 160-bit 
modular multiplication and one 160-bit modular 
addition are both less than 3 msec. Our analysis on the 
ECC algorithm shows that the algorithm uses two 
modular multiplications to verify the signature, two 
modular multiplications + one modular addition to sign 
the signature, and 2 msec to hash hj , a total of 3*2 + 
3*2 + 3 + 2 = 17 msec. Then our distributed voting 
scheme needs to hash the one-way hash function and 
the needed time is subject to the value of the threshold 
t, which will be 2t msec. A larger t will cost more but 
will ensure higher system security. Thus the total time 
to process the revocation information at the sensor side 
will be 17 + 2t msec. 17 + 2t msec may be longer than 
the symmetric cryptography takes but is definitely 
much shorter than the traditional PKC scheme requires, 
and we believe the hardware of sensor nodes can afford 
this amount of calculation time. 
A f t e r  node  dep loy me nt  and  secu re - l ink 
establishment, the revocation mechanism will be put 
into work when a node is compromised. According to 
[2], the time for setting up the communication key will 
be 1437 bits or 180 bytes, which is considered close to 
the communication complexity of our scheme, 
acceptable to the sensor nodes and thus not to be 
included in our discussion here. As mentioned, when a 
sensor node detects a neighbor node may have been 
compromised, it will broadcast a CRL to other 
neighbor nodes to inform of the attack. A CRL will 
consume 352 bits or 44 bytes bandwidth, in which the 
node ID, the valid date D of the certificate, the 
t i mes t a mp  toge the r  t akes  64  b i t s  and  the 
RevocationCIDУhj value alone consumes 160 bits or 
20 bytes. 44 bytes, the amount of communication 
bandwidth our scheme needs for the revocation 
operation, is  feasible for a sensor network. 
4.3. Performance Comparison  
Table 2 lists our comprehensive comparison 
between our new scheme and two other distributed 
revocation schemes, i.e., the CGPM scheme in [8] and 
the CC scheme in [9].  
As the table indicates, our new scheme outperforms 
the other two schemes in enhancing network security 
because it is the only scheme to employ the PKC 
mechanism for key-distribution and the asymmetric 
cryptography for encryption. The CGPM scheme [8] 
achieves higher network security than the CC scheme 
mainly because it uses the Merkle tree to authenticate 
the validity of votes while the CC scheme sets no 
mechanisms to authenticate the revocation votes. 
5. Conclusions 
In wireless sensor networks, a node revocation 
scheme conducted in a distributed way is effective in 
reducing the damages caused by a compromised node, 
however, the operation of such a distributed revocation 
scheme tends to consume large-scale memory space of 
the resource-constrained sensor nodes. To reduce such 
complexity, this paper presents a new distributed 
voting revocation scheme based on the one-way hash 
chain, the concept of threshold secret sharing, the 
certificate revocation list (CRL) and the public-key 
cryptography (PKC). Performance evaluation shows 
that, when compared with related node revocation 
schemes, our scheme achieves stronger network 
security at higher calculation cost due to its PKC 
distributed voting mechanism. To reduce the cost, we 
bring in the one-way hash function and the XOR 
operation and manage to reduce energy consumption to 
an acceptable level for the hardware-constrained sensor 
nodes.  
Node revocation is indeed a rare case which 
happens only when the system is under attack, but 
when it happens, how to maintain network security 
becomes a critically important issue. As security 
analysis shows our new revocation scheme 
outperforms the other target schemes in resisting 
adversaries’ advanced attacks, we consider it feasible 
and practical to earn such enhanced network security at 
reasonable and acceptable calculation cost.  
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